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Abstract
Electoral platform convergence is perceived unfavorably by both the popular press
and many academic scholars. This paper provides a formal account of these perceived
negative eﬀects. We show that when parties do not know voters’ preferences perfectly,
voters prefer some platform divergence to the convergent policy outcome of competition
between opportunistic, oﬃce-motivated, parties. We characterize when voters prefer
responsible parties (which weight policy positively in their utility function) to oppor-
tunistic ones. Voters prefer responsible parties when oﬃce beneﬁts and concentration of
moderate voters are high enough relative to the ideological polarization between parties.
In particular, with optimally-chosen oﬃce beneﬁts, responsible parties improve welfare.
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Kingdom1 Introduction
Since the seminal papers of Hotelling (1929), Downs (1957), and Black (1958), spatial com-
petition models have greatly advanced our understanding of elections and campaigning. The
central prediction is the median voter theorem: Given voters with single-peaked preferences
over a unidimensional policy space and two oﬃce-motivated parties who are perfectly in-
formed about voter preferences, both parties locate at the median voter’s preferred policy in
the unique equilibrium. In particular, there is perfect policy convergence. This insight extends
to many variations of the basic model. For example, policy convergence occurs when parties
are policy-motivated but perfectly informed about voter preferences, or oﬃce-motivated and
imperfectly informed about voter preferences.1
Platform convergence is not perceived favorably by the popular press, nor by many aca-
demic scholars. To wit, it is often argued that there is “not enough choice” between candi-
dates, and that “they are all the same.” Indeed, a manifesto calling for “responsible parties”
presented in 1950 by the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science
Association, which included the most inﬂuential political scientists of the day, was based on
the premise that oﬃce-motivated parties do not provide the electorate enough choice. Their
opening statement reads, “Popular government of a nation [...] requires political parties that
provide the electorate with a proper range of choice between alternatives of action.” (Com-
mittee on Political Parties (1950), page 15). Practical proposals are also presented on how
diﬀerentiated party platforms should be formed and how parties should insure their imple-
mentation by elected candidates (pages 50–56). Page (1978), page 21, observes that “[Many]
American political scientists, most notably Woodrow Wilson and E.E. Schattschneider, have
[...] called for parties to provide the electorate with suﬃcient choice” (our italics).
Despite the wide-spread negative perception of policy convergence, we are not aware of
1Models that induce platform separation feature policy-motivated candidates with uncertain voter
preferences (Wittman (1983), Calvert (1985)), oﬃce-motivated candidates with asymmetric information
about voter preferences (Bernhardt, Duggan, and Squintani (2007, 2008)), platform-motivated candidates
(Callander and Wilkie (2003), Kartik and McAfee (2006)), heterogeneity in candidate valence (Aragones and
Palfrey (2002), Groseclose (2001)) or personality (Gul and Pesendorfer (2006)), the threat of entry by a third
candidate (Palfrey (1984)), or citizen-candidate models where candidates cannot commit to policies (Osborne
and Slivinsky (1996), Besley and Coate (1997)).
1any theoretical explanation of the supposed negative eﬀects of platform convergence. Indeed,
under conventional assumptions, it is easy to draw the contrary welfare implication that policy
convergence maximizes voter welfare. To elaborate, if voters have symmetric, single-peaked,
risk-averse preferences, then they all prefer the known median policy to an election between
two diﬀerentiated parties who win with equal probability and, hence, must be located sym-
metrically about the median policy. More generally, dropping symmetry, risk aversion alone
implies that a majority of voters prefer convergence to the median to an election with two
diﬀerentiated parties that produce an electoral tie. This insight extends to spatial models of
electoral competition that derive policy divergence in equilibrium (e.g., the citizen-candidate
models of Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) or Besley and Coate (1997)).
This note provides a formal account of the wide-spread unfavorable view of platform con-
vergence and of claims that oﬃce-motivated parties do not provide voters with enough choice.
We show that in a model where voters’ preferences are not perfectly known by parties, some
divergence in platforms is beneﬁcial to all voters. If there is slight dispersion in party platforms
around the median of the distribution of the median voter, then each platform individually tar-
gets the median less accurately; but collectively, the platform closest to the realized position of
the median voter is more accurate. Thus, the message of the Downsian model is fully reversed:
Diﬀerentiated platforms raise voter welfare. To gain intuition for this result, consider a simple
example where the median policy may take two values, −x and x, with equal probability. If
the parties converge at the median of the distribution of medians, say 0, then the median voter
incurs a loss independently of the median policy realization. Instead, if the left party chooses
platform −x, and the right party chooses platform x, then the median voter can match the real-
ized median policy with the appropriate party and achieve her bliss point. Our analysis extends
this simple example to general distributions of voters exhibiting positive correlation across
voter ideal points, and it shows that voters unanimously prefer some party platform dispersion.
Having concluded that some policy divergence unambiguously improves welfare, we give
conditions under which the equilibrium policy outcome of competition between opportunistic
parties (which are purely oﬃce-motivated) is worse than the outcome from responsible parties
(which accrue some utility from policy) When the median policy is unknown, opportunistic
2parties’ platforms converge to the median of the distribution of the median voter’s position, as
candidates fail to internalize the externality of providing voters choice. Responsible parties,
in contrast, trade oﬀ the probability of winning the election against the policy realized in
equilibrium, and they choose platforms closer to their preferred policies than the median of
the median policy distribution—in equilibrium, they diﬀerentiate policies.
We identify conditions under which responsible parties provide voters higher ex-ante wel-
fare than opportunistic parties by identifying when the distance between the parties’ equi-
librium platforms is positive but below a welfare-improving threshold. We show that the
dispersion in equilibrium policies of responsible parties rises with the degree of ideological
polarization and falls with the beneﬁts from oﬃce and with the concentration of moderate
voters. Indeed, if oﬃce beneﬁts are too great or moderate voters are too concentrated, or
parties are too ideologically similar, strategic incentives induce the parties to converge at the
median of medians, replicating the equilibrium with opportunistic parties.
Thus, the economies for which responsible parties are welfare improving are described by
a two-dimensional set in the space of parameters: essentially, all voters prefer responsible par-
ties when the degree of ideological polarization between the parties is not too great relative
to the level of oﬃce beneﬁt and the concentration of moderate voters. In particular, there is
always a range of oﬃce beneﬁts for which responsible parties improve welfare. Indeed, given
any degree of ideological polarization between parties and concentration of moderate voters,
there is a level of oﬃce beneﬁts that maximizes ex-ante welfare for all voters; and provided
parties are suﬃciently polarized, the optimal assignment of oﬃce beneﬁts can achieve the so-
cially optimal level of platform dispersion. Further, the welfare-improving threshold of oﬃce
beneﬁts increases with uncertainty about the location of the median voter, reinforcing the
case for responsible parties.
On the route to our welfare result, we give general conditions for existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium in the party location game, complementing the analyses of Wittman (1983) and
Calvert (1985). We also show that provided the separation between the parties’ platforms is
not too great, all voters beneﬁt from increases in the degreee of ideological polarization between
parties, decreases in the concentration of moderate voters, or decreases in oﬃce beneﬁts.
32 Analysis
We ﬁrst consider the standard Downsian model, in which parties know the bliss point of the
median voter, and show that a majority of voters are hurt by divergence from the median
policy. The remainder of the paper addresses the situation in which parties are uncertain
about the location of the median voter: In sharp contrast, voters unanimously prefer some
divergence of party platforms, up to a welfare-improving threshold, to platforms that converge
to the median of the distribution of the median voter’s ideal policy. We later provide conditions
under which the separation between the equilibrium policies of responsible parties respects
this threshold and increases the ex ante welfare of all voters.
We suppose that voter preferences are described by symmetric and strictly concave utility
functions deﬁned on a one-dimensional space. A voter is indexed by her preferred policy θ, and
when policy z is adopted, her utility is u(θ,z) = w(|θ − z|), where w is twice-diﬀerentiable,
strictly decreasing, and strictly concave, i.e., w′ < 0 and w′′ < 0. Because a voter’s preferences
are symmetric around her bliss point, each voter votes for the party whose platform is closest
to her preferred policy, voting for the parties with equal probabilities when indiﬀerent (or
when the parties choose the same platform). We initially assume that the median   of the
distribution over θ is known and, without loss of generality, normalized to zero.
Let Wθ(xL,xR) represent the expected welfare of voter θ when parties use strategies xL and
xR, where without loss of generality, we assume that xL ≤ xR. We ﬁrst compare the median
convergent platforms, xL = 0 = xR, with any symmetric divergent platforms, xR = −xL =
x > 0. Because platforms are symmetrically located around the median   = 0, each party
wins with probability 1/2. From risk aversion, we conclude that convergence to the median
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w(|−θ|) = Wθ (0,0).
Now suppose that departures from the median are asymmetric, i.e., that xL  = −xR, and
4suppose without loss of generality that 0 < |xL| < |xR|. It follows that welfare is:
Wθ (xL,xR) = w(|xL − θ|).
Then, by deﬁnition of the median, Wθ (0,0) > Wθ (xL,xR) for a strict majority of voters θ.
Obviously, if either xL = 0 or xR = 0, but xL  = −xR, then each voter θ’s welfare Wθ (xL,xR)
coincides with Wθ (0,0). Summarizing, we have proved the following result.
Proposition 1 Assume that parties know the median policy. Then compared to platforms
that converge to the median policy, i.e., xL = xR = 0:
1. Any other platform pair (xL,xR) symmetric around the median policy, i.e., with −xL =
xR = x > 0, strictly reduces the expected utility of all voters.
2. Any asymmetric pair (xL,xR) where neither party adopts the median policy, i.e., with
xL  = 0 and xR  = 0, strictly reduces the expected utility of a majority of voters.
3. Voter utility is unchanged by any pair where at least one party adopts the median policy.
In sum, platform divergence from a known median policy always hurts a majority of voters.
Henceforth, we consider a setting where the median voter is unknown to the parties. As
is standard in the literature on Bayesian games, we model the location of the median voter as
a random variable. We decompose the bliss point of a voter v as follows:
θv = δv +   + εv.
The term δv is ﬁxed and represents the ex-ante diﬀerence between the bliss point of voter v
and the median. We assume that δv is distributed symmetrically around zero across voters,
with connected and bounded support. The term   represents a common shock that shifts all
voters’ bliss points in the same way, and it is distributed with connected support according
to the symmetric, continuously diﬀerentiable density f, i.e., f (− ) = f ( ) for all  , with
the implication that f′ (0) = 0 and, since the support of f is connected, f(0) > 0. Finally,
εv is an idiosyncratic shock that may change the position of voter v relative to the median.2
2All of the arguments of the paper go through when the εv term is dropped.
5We assume that εv is distributed independently of   with connected support according to
a symmetric density, g, so that g(εv) = −g (−εv) for all εv. We assume that there is no
aggregate uncertainty in the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks εv. Hence, the median of the
ex-post distribution is   with probability one, but the identities of the ex-ante and ex-post
median voters diﬀer with probability one.
Given platforms (xL,xR), the ex-ante welfare of voter v is obtained by integrating over
both the common shock   to the electorate and the idiosyncratic shock ǫv. Parties do not
see these shocks prior to their choices of platforms. Therefore, their platforms are treated as
ﬁxed in the calculation of ex-ante welfare. As highlighted in the introduction, however, the
outcome of the election does depend on preferences, as the winning party will be the party
located closest to the realized median. The ex-ante welfare of voter v, denoted Wv(xL,xR), is
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w(|xR −   − δv − εv|)f ( )d 
 
g (εv)dεv.
If we view Wv(−x,x) as a function of x, then it is the integral of strictly concave functions
and is therefore itself strictly concave. We now show that voters unanimously prefer some
diﬀerentiation of parties symmetrically around the median of medians.
Proposition 2 Assume that the median policy is unknown to the parties. Then there ex-
ists ¯ x > 0 such that Wv (−x,x) > Wv (0,0), for all x ∈ (0, ¯ x) and all v. That is, voters
unanimously prefer symmetrically diﬀerentiated platforms (xL = −x,xR = x) to platform
convergence at the median of medians, 0.
The appendix to the paper contains the proofs of Proposition ?? and other results not
proved in the text.
The preceding result implies that when the median voter is unknown, platform convergence
hurts all voters. In this case, convergent platforms cannot perfectly target the median policy,
even if they converge to the median of the median policy distribution. Introducing slight
6dispersion in party platforms, individual platforms target the unknown median less accurately.
Collectively, however, the platform closest to the realized median can be more accurate than
the median of the median policy distribution. If platform divergence is bounded above by
the welfare-improving threshold, ¯ x, then divergence in fact increases voter welfare. Thus, the
message of the Downsian model is fully reversed: Platform convergence hurts all voters.
We now determine conditions under which voters prefer responsible parties to opportunis-
tic, purely oﬃce-motivated, parties. In equilibrium, opportunistic parties choose platform
x = 0, the median of the distribution of median voters. We model responsible parties as
having mixed policy and oﬃce motivations, ` a la Wittman (1984) or Calvert (1985). For expo-
sitional simplicity, we restrict attention to parties L and R with symmetric bliss points −π and
π, respectively, so that π > 0 measures the degree of ideological polarization between parties.
For simplicity, assume π/2 lies in the support of f. The party that wins oﬃce also receives
a beneﬁt b ∈ ℜ+ ∪ {∞}. We focus on symmetric equilibria, with −xL = xR = x. Hence, if
policy x is implemented, then the utility of party L is w(| − π − x|) if it loses the election and
w(| − π − x|)+b if it wins; and the utility of party R is w(|π − x|) if it loses the election and
w(|π − x|)+b if it wins. The case b = 0 captures purely policy-motivated parties, and b = ∞
represents purely oﬃce-motivated parties. Parties are expected utility maximizers, and to
ensure that the parties’ expected payoﬀs are single-peaked over the relevant range, we assume







1 − F ( )
.3
To guarantee that the equilibrium policy x increases in π, we assume




w′ (x + π) − w′(π − x)
w(x + π) − w(π − x)
.
Note that (A2) is satisﬁed when utilities are quadratic, i.e., w(|x|) ≡ −|x|2.
Next, we characterize the equilibrium platforms of the game between the parties. Our
result complements the analysis of Wittman (1983), who considers candidates who maximize
3This condition is satisﬁed if f is single-peaked and 1−F is log concave on [0,π/2]. Then −f(µ)/(1−F(µ))
is decreasing, which implies that the derivative has sign −(1 − F(µ))f′(µ) − f(µ)2 ≤ 0, which implies (A1).
7a “weighted mandate” (p.151), and Calvert (1985). Calvert (1985) establishes a continuity
result for responsible parties, but does not give conditions for existence, uniqueness, nor char-
acterize equilibrium for the case of mixed motives. We establish existence and uniqueness of
a symmetric equilibrium.4 We give a threshold level of oﬃce beneﬁt, b = −w′(π)/f(0), such
that if the beneﬁts of oﬃce exceed the threshold, then convergence at the median of medians,
0, is sustained as the unique equilibrium, extending Calvert’s (1985) result on “estimated
medians” to the case of suﬃciently high oﬃce beneﬁts. More interestingly, when beneﬁts lie
below the threshold, the equilibrium is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition of the par-
ties, allowing us to derive comparative statics on the parameters that describe the economy.
Intuitively, −f(0)b represents the marginal cost to party R of a small move from the (0,0)
platform pair, while w′(π) represents the marginal gain: convergence at 0 can be supported
as an equilibrium if and only if the marginal cost of a deviation oﬀsets the marginal gain.
Proposition 3 Under (A1), there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium (−x,x), and this
satisﬁes x ∈ [0,π). In particular, x = 0 if b ≥ −w′(π)/f(0), and x > 0 is the unique solution to
w′(π − x)
w(x + π) − w(π − x) − b
= f (0) (1)
if b < −w′ (π)/f (0). Adding (A2), if equilibrium platforms are interior, i.e., x ∈ (0,π), then
responsible parties adopt more extreme policy positions as (a) the ideological polarization π
grows, (b) the density f (0) of the distribution of the median   at zero falls, or (c) the beneﬁts
from holding oﬃce fall. That is, ∂x/∂π > 0, ∂x/∂f (0) < 0, and ∂x/∂b < 0.
A corollary establishes conditions under which the welfare of every voter is higher with re-
sponsible parties than with opportunistic parties, vindicating appeals for responsible parties.
From Proposition ??, there is a threshold ¯ x such that if the symmetric equilibrium (−x,x) in
the game between responsible parties satisﬁes 0 < x < ¯ x, then all voters prefer the divergent
responsible party platforms to the convergent platforms oﬀered by opportunistic parties. In
particular, when b < −w′(π)/f(0), equilibrium is characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions,
and the symmetric equilibrium satisﬁes x > 0. A straightforward continuity argument then
4Saporiti (2008), Proposition 2, derives a related result on existence and uniqueness in a model with
probabilistic voting.
8yields how changes in the parameters decribing the economy aﬀect the symmetric equilib-
rium policy choices. Since w′(π)/f(0) is negative, an implication is that there is always a
non-degenerate range of oﬃce beneﬁts for which responsible parties are beneﬁcial.
Corollary 1 Under (A1) and (A2), there is a threshold ¯ x > 0 such that if the symmetric equi-
librium (−x,x) satisﬁes 0 < x < ¯ x, then all voters prefer responsible parties to opportunistic
parties. Further, if b + w′(π)/f(0) is negative and close enough to zero, then the symmetric
equilibrium indeed satisﬁes 0 < x < ¯ x.
The comparative statics results of Proposition ?? have further implications for voter wel-
fare. For each voter v, let xv maximize Wv(−x,x), and let x∗ = infv xv be the smallest of the
ex-ante bliss points of the voters. Then Proposition ??, with concavity of Wv(−x,x), implies
that Wv(−x∗,x∗) > Wv(0,0) and d
dxWv(−x,x) > 0 at all policies in [0,x∗). By Proposition

























for all x ∈ [0,x∗) and all voters v. In particular, if the equilibrium dispersion of the parties’
platforms is not too great, then a small increase in the level of polarization increases the
divergence between equilibrium platforms and hence increases the welfare of all voters; while
increases in the concentration of moderate voters or oﬃce beneﬁts have the opposite eﬀect.
We now conduct a more detailed welfare analysis by imposing a parametric form for the
utility functions of voters and parties, allowing us to derive an expression for the maximal
welfare-improving threshold from Proposition ?? and to completely characterize when respon-
sible parties raise welfare. Speciﬁcally, we assume
(A3) Voters and parties have quadratic utility, i.e., w(|x|) = −|x|2 for all x.
The next lemma provides the foundations for the analysis, revealing that all voters share
the same ex-ante ordering over platform pairs that are symmetric around the ex-ante median
policy of zero, yielding unambiguous welfare comparisons. The result applies, in particular,
to symmetric equilibria of the game between the parties.
9Lemma 1 Under (A3), each voter v’s expected utility from symmetric platform pairs (−x,x)
is a ﬁxed amount δ2




Hence, we can drop the subscript on W( ) when deriving the optimal dispersion in party
platforms from the perspective of voters. The ex-ante median voter’s welfare is





(−x +   − ε)
2 g (ε)dεf ( )d ,
and diﬀerentiating with respect to x yields
d
dx





(−x +   − ε)g (ε)dεf ( )d  = 0
⇒ x = E [  − ε|  > 0] = E [ |  > 0].
Using mean-variance analysis, we can write W(−x,x) = −2[(x − E[  − ǫ])2 − V [  − ǫ]. In
particular, W(−x,x) is an aﬃne transformation of a quadratic function and is strictly concave
as a function of x. We therefore have the following result.
Proposition 4 Under (A3), the symmetric platform pair (−x,x) that maximizes the welfare
of all voters is given by x = E [ |  > 0]. Thus, policy positions up to E[ |  > 0] increase
voter welfare, and policy positions beyond E[ |  > 0] decrease voter welfare.
In order to determine precise conditions under which voters unanimously prefer responsible
parties to opportunistic parties, we must ﬁrst sharpen our equilibrium characterization. With
quadratic utilities, we can solve the ﬁrst-order condition (??) in Proposition ?? to derive a
closed-form expression for equilibrium platforms:
Corollary 2 Under (A1) and (A3), the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game between
the parties is given by x = 0 if b ≥ 2π/f (0), and it is given by
x =
2π − bf (0)
4f (0)π + 2
whenever b < 2π/f (0).
10With this result in hand, we can state our ﬁnal welfare result, which completely character-
izes the conditions under which responsible parties increase voter welfare. From the foregoing
analysis, we know that W(−x,x) is a concave, quadratic function of x: It is therefore symmet-
ric about its maximizer, E[ |  > 0]. Thus, the unique solution to the indiﬀerence condition
W(0,0) = W(−¯ x, ¯ x) is ¯ x = 2E[ |  > 0], which pins down the maximal threshold satisfying
the conditions of Proposition ?? and Corollary ??. Thus, with quadratic preferences, we see
that by all voters prefer responsible parties to opportunistic ones when the degree of ideolog-
ical polarization is not too great relative to the level of oﬃce beneﬁts and concentration of
moderate voters. We also see that the scope for improvement of voter welfare by responsible
parties increases with the level of uncertainty, through E[ |  ≥ 0], regarding the location of
the median voter.
Proposition 5 Under (A1) and (A3), responsible parties provide higher welfare to all voters
than opportunistic parties in equilibrium if and only if:
0 <
2π − bf (0)
4f (0)π + 2
< 2E [ |  ≥ 0]. (2)
These results imply that the class of economies in which responsible parties increase voter
welfare is described by a two-dimensional manifold of parameters (π,b,f(0)) such that
2π − bf (0)
4f (0)π + 2
= 2E [ |  ≥ 0].
We can then explicitly calculate the parameter values under which responsible parties raise
voter welfare. For example, suppose that 1 > 4f(0)E[ |  ≥ 0], so that the welfare comparison
depends on the degree of polarization, π, and oﬃce beneﬁts, b. Then for high enough π, we
have 2π
4f(0)π+2 > 2E[ |  ≥ 0], and we can calculate the range of oﬃce beneﬁts such that
responsible parties increase voter welfare:







These insights also shed light on the issue of optimal institutional design: a propitious choice
of oﬃce beneﬁt of b =
π[2−4f(0)E[µ|µ≥0]]−2E[µ|µ≥0]
f(0) can achieve exactly the socially-optimal pol-
icy locations from Proposition ??. Our analysis suggests, in this context, that oﬃce beneﬁts
11should be higher when parties are more polarized, in order to induce platform moderation on
the optimal policy, x = E [ |  ≥ 0].
3 Conclusion
The central prediction of spatial models of electoral competition is the median voter theorem.
However, platform convergence is unfavorably perceived by the popular press, and by many
academic scholars. It is often argued that there is “not enough choice” between candidates
(Committee on Political Parties (1950)). We provide a formal account of the supposed negative
eﬀects of platform convergence in a rational-choice theoretic setting. We show that in a model
where voter preferences are not perfectly known, voters unanimously prefer some amount of
platform divergence to the policy convergent outcome. Further, we give general conditions
for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the game between the parties, extending the
analyses of Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985). We determine the conditions under which
responsible parties provide all voters higher welfare than opportunistic parties—this occurs
when the degree of ideological polarization is not too great relative to the level of oﬃce ben-
eﬁt and the concentration of moderate voters—and we present comparative statics on party
platforms and voter welfare. Speciﬁcally, when the separation between the parties’ platforms
is not too great, the welfare of all voters increases with an increase in ideological polarization,
a decrease in the concentration of moderate voters, or a decrease in the level of oﬃce beneﬁt.
Finally, we characterize the level of oﬃce beneﬁts that maximize ex-ante voter welfare.
A Proofs of Propositions
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Hence, because we integrate over the positive reals,   > 0, there are three cases:
Case 1:  −δ−ε > 0 and − −δ−ε > 0. Then |  − δ − ε| > |−  − δ − ε|, because   > 0,
and γ (0, ,ε) = −w′ (|  − ε − δ|) + w′(|−  − ε − δ|).
Case 2:   − δ − ε > 0 and −   − δ − ε < 0. Then γ (0, ,ε) = −w′ (|  − ε − δ|) −
w′(|−  − ε − δ|).
Case 3:  −δ−ε < 0 and − −δ−ε < 0. Then |−  − δ − ε| > |  − δ − ε|, because   > 0,
and γ (0, ,ε) = w′(|  − ε − δ|) − w′(|−  − ε − δ|).
In all cases, w′ < 0 and w′′ < 0 imply γ (0, ,ε) > 0.
Let ∆ be a compact set containing δv for all voters v. We have shown that
∂
∂xWδ (−x,x) > 0
at x = 0 for all δ. Since Wδ(−x,x) is concave in x, argmaxx Wδ(−x,x) is uniquely de-
ﬁned, and therefore argmaxx Wδ(−x,x) > 0 for all δ. By the theorem of the maximum,
argmaxx Wδ(−x,x) is continuous in δ, and therefore it attains a minimum, x∗ > 0, on the
compact set ∆. Given δ ∈ ∆, concavity of Wδ(−x,x) then implies that Wδ(−x,x) > Wδ(0,0)
for all x ∈ (0,x∗]. Therefore, for all v and all x ∈ (0,x∗], we have Wv(−x,x) > W(0,0).
Proof of Proposition ??. Given locations xL < xR, party R wins the election whenever
  > [xL + xR]/2, so she wins with probability 1 − F ([xL + xR]/2). Given xL = xR, party
R wins with probability one half, creating a payoﬀ discontinuity. Suppose that L chooses a
location −x < 0. Because π ≥ 0, i.e., the bliss point of R is positive, party R will never choose





w(| − x − π|)F ([−x + xR]/2) if −x < xR
+[w(|xR − π|) + b][1 − F ([−x + xR]/2)]
w(| − xR − π|) + 1
2b if −x = xR,
13which is diﬀerentiable whenever −x < xR or −x = xR = 0. Diﬀerentiating, we obtain:
∂
∂xR
U (−x,xR) = w(| − x − π|)






[1 − F ([−x + xR]/2)] + [w(|xR − π|) + b][−
f ([−x + xR]/2)
2
].
We ﬁrst establish that the platform xR maximizing U (−x,xR) is such that xR ≤ π. In case
xR > π, deﬁne x′ = min{x,π}, and note that F([−x + xR]/2) ≤ 1/2 and
U(−x,x
′) − U(−x,xR)
= w(x + π)[F([−x + x
′]/2) − F([−x + xR]/2)]
+[w(π − x
′) + b][1 − F([−x + x
′]/2)] − [w(|π − xR|) + b][1 − F([−x + xR]/2)]
= [w(π − x
′) + b − w(x + π)][F([−x + xR]/2) − F([−x + x
′]/2)]
+[w(π − x
′) − w(|π + xR|)][1 − F([−x + xR]/2)].
Further, w(π − x′) + b > w(x + π), and either F([−x + xR]/2) > F([−x + x′]/2) or F([−x +
xR]/2) < 1. We conclude that U(−x,x′) > U(−x,xR), so xR is not a maximizer, as claimed.
We now show that given x ∈ [0,π], there is at most one solution to the ﬁrst-order condition
∂
∂xRU(−x,xR) = 0 on the interval (−x,π] (or on [−x,π] if −x = 0), and if there is one, then





= w(| − x − π|)
f′ ([−x + xR]/2)
4
+ w

















f ([−x + xR]/2)
2
]
+[b + w(|xR − π|)][−
f′ ([−x + xR]/2)
4
]




′′(π − xR)[1 − F ([−x + xR]/2)]
+w
′(π − xR)f ([−x + xR]/2).
Rewriting the ﬁrst derivative as
∂U (−x,xR)
∂xR
= [w(x + π) − b − w(π − xR)]
f ([−x + xR]/2)
2
− w
′(π − xR)[1 − F ([−x + xR]/2)],











= [w(x + π) − b − w(π − xR)]
f′ ([−x + xR]/2)
4
+ w
′′ (π − xR)[1 − F ([−x + xR]/2)]
+[w(x + π) − w(π − b − xR)]
f ([−x + xR]/2)
2[1 − F ([−x + xR]/2)]




[w(x + π) − b − w(π − xR)]
 
f′ ([−x + xR]/2)
2
+
f ([−x + xR]/2)
2




f′ ([−x + xR]/2)
2
+
f ([−x + xR]/2)
2
[1 − F ([−x + xR]/2)]
 
≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from (A1). We have shown that every solution to the ﬁrst-
order condition satisﬁes the second-order suﬃcient condition for a strict local maximizer.
Therefore, by continuity, the solutions are locally isolated. Consider any such solution x1, and
if x1 is not unique, suppose there is a solution greater than x1; in particular, let x2 be the next
solution, i.e., if y solves (??) and y < x2, then y ≤ x1. Assume without loss of generality that
U(−x,x1) ≥ U(−x,x2). Since x2 is a strict local maximizer, it follows that min{U(−x,y) |
y ≥ [x1,x2]} < U(−x,x2). But then this minimum must be achieved at some y ∈ (x1,x2), and
y must solve the ﬁrst-order condition, a contradiction. If there is a solution to the ﬁrst-order
condition, then a similar argument implies that it is the unique maximizer, as claimed.
It follows that given x ∈ [0,π], there is a unique best response r(x) in [0,π] for party R.
Indeed, if z and z′ are distinct best responses, then z,z′ ∈ {0,π}, for if z ∈ (0,π), then z
satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition and, by the above argument, is the unique best response for
party R. Thus, 0 and π are both best responses. Then U(−x, ) achieves a minimum, say
z∗, on [0,π], but then z∗ satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition and is the unique best response, a
contradiction. That the mapping r: [−π,π] → [−π,π] so-deﬁned is continuous follows directly
from an application of the theorem of the maximum. By Brower’s theorem, r admits a ﬁxed
point, and we claim that (−x,x) is a symmetric equilibrium. By symmetry of the parties, it is
immediate that −x is a best response to x for party L in [−π,0]. It remains to be shown that
party R cannot deviate proﬁtably to a platform y such that −x ≤ y < 0. We have argued
that r(x) is the unique best response in (−x,π], so we need only verify that y = −x is not
proﬁtable. Consider the sequence {yn} deﬁned by yn = y + 1
n. Since y < 0 and F and w are
continuous, it follows that 1−F(yn) → 1−F(y) > 1/2 and w(−yn+π) → w(y+π), and then
U(−x,y) = w(−y + π) +
1
2
b ≤ w(−y + π) + [1 − F(y)]b = lim
n→∞U(−x,yn).
15Since U(−x,yn) < U(−x,r(x)) for all n, we conclude that U(−x,y) ≤ U(−x,r(x)), as re-
quired.
We now restrict attention to symmetric equilibria and impose xL = xR = x. The ﬁrst-order





   
 
xR=x









w′ (π − x)
w(x + π) − w(π − x) − b
= f (0). (3)
Note that the left-hand side of (??) is strictly decreasing, so it has at most one solution.
Evaluated at x = π, the left-hand side of (??) equals zero, so ∂
∂xRU(−π,xR)|xR=π < 0, and
we conclude that (−π,π) cannot be an equilibrium. We consider three remaining cases. If
−w′(π)/b < f(0), then the left-hand side of (??) evaluated at x = 0 is less than f(0), and














so xR = xL = 0 is the unique symmetric equilibrium. If −w′(π)/b = f(0), then x = 0 is the
unique solution of (??), and (0,0) is the unique symmetric equilibrium. Finally, if −w′(π)/b >
f(0), then the left-hand side of (??) evaluated at x = 0 is greater than f(0), while evaluated at
π it is equal to zero and less than f(0). Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, (??) as
a positive solution, which is unique and then characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium.
Provided that x ∈ (0,π), the equation deﬁning the equilibrium is
φ(π,x,f (0),b) ≡ −w
′(π − x) + f (0)[w(x + π) − w(π − x) − b] = 0.







−w′′ (π − x) + f (0)[w′(x + π) − w′(π − x)]
w′′ (π − x) + f (0)[w′(x + π) + w′ (π − x)]
∝ −w
′′ (π − x) + f (0)[w
′(x + π) − w
′(π − x)]
= −w
′′ (π − x) +
w′(π − x)
w(x + π) − w(π − x)
[w
′(x + π) − w





w′(x + π) − w′ (π − x)
w(x + π) − w(π − x)
> 0,







w(x + π) − w(π − x) − b
w′′ (π − x) + f (0)[w′ (x + π) + w′ (π − x)]









w′′ (π − x) + f (0)[w′ (x + π) + w′ (π − x)]
∝ −f (0) < 0.
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